posted by Jennifer Hlad on May 24
I e-mailed Nathaniel Travers about the findings, and thought I’d share his response with you:
“Of course they did. If they didn’t it would look pretty bad for all of the upper echelon staff who rushed to get MSOC F out the door and into action in a kind of warfare they were not prepared to fight. Afghanistan is not Iraq, the training and experience base were insufficient, too much emphasis was placed on Direct Action and too little place on counterinsurgency basics, and Afghanis were slaughtered on the highway as a result.
The (then) MSOC idea has a lot of growing up to do before it can ever be as effective as an ODA. My brief experience with a collocated ODA showed me how premature the MSOC deployment was as far as the crucial Human Intelligence piece was concerned and probably a good reason MSOC F was sent to a rather calm area of operations. However, given over-zealous Recon Marines and enough equipment to outfit an infantry battalion, damage was done that sent Human Intelligence and basic human relations efforts back to square one, 2001. I testified true to my heart for my family, for my son. It doesn’t matter what the General’s verdict is, my conscience is clear and I know I have set a moral standard for my son to live up to.”