posted by Jennifer Hlad on Jan 29
Mark Waple, Maj. Galvin’s civilian lawyer, began his closing statement by clarifying what he called “mischaracterizations” in Sanchez’s statement.
For example, he said, any “go fever” that may have existed was on the part of MARSOC (Marine Corps Forces Special Operations Command) and MARCENT (Marine Corps Forces Central Command), not MSOC-F.
He then outlined six questions the panel will likely address, and some evidence to support an answer to those questions.
First, he said, the question of whether the Marines experienced at least one complex attack.
At least two dozen pieces of evidence indicate the Marines did, in fact, come under at least one complex attack, Waple said, including the way traffic behaved, testimony from 16 Marines about hearing small arms fire, brass shell casings found in the area, opinions from EOD specialists about bullet impacts in one of the Humvees and information from a non-Afghan witness nearby about hearing two distinct types of gunfire.
The second question is could the Marine make up the story about the complex attack, Waple said. The answer, he said, is no. That answer is supported by the descriptions the Marines gave on the radio immediately after the IED blast — which would not have allowed enough time to create a false story, as well as the information they gave when they arrived back at the base.
“They didn’t stop for 15 minutes and get in a huddle,” he said.
The third question is whether Afghan citizens had reason to lie about what happened, Waple said, and there are “at least 20 reasons” to believe that people were motivated and did lie.
Tribal elders told some citizens to say they were injured to get money, Waple said, and the number of Afghans who volunteered to be interviewed by NCIS agents increased substantially after the first solatia ceremony.
There are a number of reasons to believe Haji Liwani Qumandan “was up to no good” on the morning of March 4, Waple said, including his testimony that he was carrying $10,000 worth of Afghan currency in his car, but no weapon for protection.
The fourth question, Waple said, was “Did MSOC-F exercise proportionate and discriminate fire?”
The fact that most of the damage to the blue Prado was to specific areas and that Afghans have testified the Marines still used hand and arm signals after the blast to get vehicles to move indicated that they did not use excessive force, Waple said.
The fifth question is how thorough and reliable was the investigation by Col. Pihana, and what impact did that have on the NCIS investigation, Waple said. The answer is “not very,” he said.
Pihana did not interview the ROC watch officer, did not interview the interpreter who was traveling with the convoy, did not ask for ammunition logs and changed his mind about small arms fire after talking to Afghan witnesses, among other problems, Waple said.
And the last is whether there was a disconnect between MSOC-F and CJSOTF and Task Force Spartan, Waple said.
“There clearly was a major disconnect,” which is part of why the court of inquiry was even called, he said.
MSOC-F was “long on teeth and short on tail. And CJSOTF couldn’t … or wouldn’t, provide the tail.”
The conclusions Waple said he’d like to see are: that there was no failure or deriliction of duty by Maj. Galvin on March 4, that the use of force by MSOC-F was consistent with the rules of engagment at the time, the efforts to document the mission and situation were sufficient, and that the command climate fostered by Galvin was appropriate.
Waple said he and everyone involved regrets the possible deaths and injuries of civilians, but that the responsibility for those deaths and injuries lies with the individuals responsible for the attack.
“We are simply asking that you treat Maj. Galvin and Capt. Noble fairly,” he said.